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This Communication is  about the international aspects of competition law.  It examines 
whether public international law, and espcciaiiy the WTO, should be complemented by a 
specific framework to support competition law enforcement 
1
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The concepts and proposals set out  in  this  paper build on  the  report of the  group  of 
experts  established  by  Commissioner  van  Miert  in  June  1994.  That  report,  entitled 
"Competition Policy in  the New Trade Order:  Strengthening International  Cooperation 
and Rules", was published in July 1995. 
The experts'  report covered  both  bilateral  and  multilateral  cooperation  111  the  field  of 
competition.  Their  paraiiel  development  was  considered  to  be  complementary  and 
mutually  supportive.  Thus,  although  the  emphasis  of  this  Communication  is  on 
multilateral  aspects,  the  further  development  of  bilateral  cooperation  agreements  is 
equally important and would have a favourable impact on work in a multilateral setting. 
I.  INTRODUCTION: 
a)  A_glohal p_IT.Wectivc on comnetition rules: Why international rules arc nccderl 
Two developments have characterised international economic activity in  recent decades: 
liberalisation and globalisation. Eight negotiating Rounds since GATT was established in 
1947  have brought import tariffs down to historically low  levels:  from  around 35% to 
below 4%2•  This  has  led  to  a  massive  growth  in  the  volume of trade  in  good..;  and 
services, doubling every seven to eight years and growing from around $200 billion in  the 
early sixties to exceed $5000 billion in  1994. Foreign direct investment has grown at an 
The scope of this Communication is limited to anticompetitive practices of  enterprises.  There arc many 
governmental  practices  that  have  an  effect  on  competition,  such  as  subsidies,  which  arc  grouped 
together with private practices in  the EC Treaty's chapter on competition rules. These arc by and larr;c 
already covered by rules under the World Trade Organisation (WTO). 
2  This is  the trade-weighted average of industrial tariffs that will  apply in  developed countries once the 
reduction commitm::nts of the Uruguay Round have been fully implemented. 40% of Europ1:an imports 
will even be duty free. Developing countries generally committed themselves in  the Round to bind their 
duties  in  a  horizontal  way  for  the  first  time,  with  highest levels  mostly  around  20-351;;,_  Remaining 
quantitative restraints on imports, in specific sectors such as agriculture or textiles, but also with regard 
to generic practices such as voluntary export restraints, arc to be phased out by all WTO Member~. 
2 even more spectacular rate- by a factor of thirty in  less than twenty five years.  National 
economics arc more open to foreign competition today than ever before. 
At the  microcconomic  level  firms  have  adopted  global  strategies.  Libcralisation  and 
technological progress have driven them to adopt new production methods: exploiting the 
comparative  advantage  of  countries,  improving  their  mobility,  shifting  factors  of 
production, moving into new  markets etc.  Firms often  need to  be  present on different 
markets  at  the  same  time  to  stay  competitive.  As  a  result  countries  have  become 
interdependent and the  markets of many goods  and services  have become regional  or 
even global. 
The number and size of transnational firms  has  increased. There arc  more commercial 
practices that  have an  international dimension  than  ever before.  These can lead  to  an 
increase  in  cross-border  anti-competitive  practices:  cartels  with  international  effects, 
agreements  whose  effect  is  to  exclude  (foreign)  competitors  in  an  unfair  way, 
international abuses of a dominant position, or international mergers with anticompctitivc 
effects.  Such practices can limit competition and undermine the benefits of libcralisation. 
These developments call  into question the domestic nature of competition rules and the 
absence  of binding  rules  at  the  international  level.  Many  countries  or regions  have 
implemented comprehensive competition  policies,  but  Jack  appropriate  instruments  to 
apply  domestic  competition  rules  to  anti-competitive  practices  with  an  international 
dimension,  as  well  as  to  obtain  relevant  information  outside  their  jurisdiction.  A 
framework is then necessary to enhance the effective enforcement of competition rules. 
In the Community anticompetitivc practices arc effectively dealt with in  an even-handed 
and non-discriminatory way across Member States.  Competition policy is  a cornerstone 
of the Community legal order.  But there are no competition rules at the global level, and 
in  many foreign  markets  the  means  for  redress  against  anticompetitive  practices  that 
undermine the efforts of our companies trying to compete are inadequate. 
There are then four main reasons why the adoption of international rules on competition 
should be considered: 
•  as part of the Community's strategy on  market access: anticompetitive practices are 
keeping our firms  out of third country markets  but they cannot,  in  the  absence of 
proper enforcement measures in  those third markets, be tackled effectively without 
international rules.  European firms also face a competitive disadvantage if they have 
to compete on world markets with foreign  producers operating from home markets 
that  arc  subject  to  Jess  vigorous  competition  policies.  Multilateral  rules  would 
promote more equal conditions of competition world-wide; 
•  to avoid conflicts of law and jurisdiction between countries and to promote a gradual 
convergence of competition laws. There is a real need to minimise the jurisdictional 
conflicts and  resulting trade conflicts  that  can  arise,  not only from  extraterritorial 
application of certain competition laws, but also from the application of competition 
Jaw  to  anti-competitive practices conceived abroad  but implemented within  one's 
jurisdiction.  Convergence  and  conflict  avoidance  would  also  increase  the  legal 
security of firms operating in different jurisdictions, as  well as  reduce their costs of 
compliance with competition laws; 
•  to  increase  the effectiveness  and coherence of the  Community's own competition 
policy enforcement.  As it is in many countries, competition policy is a key factor in 
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supporting  the  compcttttvcness  of  European  industry,  in  protecting  a  sound 
functioning of our market economics and in  maximising consumer welfare.  It needs 
instruments of cooperation to take account of the effects of globalisation. 
Enhanced  commitment  to  competition  policy  enforcement  would  strengthen  the 
trading system along the lines of our legal systems and market economies, of which 
competition law is a basic feature. 
These concepts are further developed below. 
b)  The competition nerspectiye 
Within  the  Community  the  elimination  of  trade  barriers  and  the  application  of 
competition law  have gone hand in  hand.  This approach  is  unique in  the world.  The 
competition  policy  of the  Community has,  in  its  development  over  thirty-five  years, 
grown to full  maturity and is  rigorous and neutral in its application.
3  Consequently, the 
Community has become a highly integrated market, with the competition provisions of 
the  Treaty  protecting  the  integrity  of the  common  market.  In  a  larger  perspective, 
however, the Community's competition policy and instruments have remained essentially 
domestic,  inward-looking  and  limited  to  conduct  implemented  within  the  common 
market and affecting trade between our Member States. 
Absence of an instrument to deal with trans  border cases 
Many countries or regions which have implemented comprehensive competition policies 
nonetheless lack the necessary instruments to apply domestic competition mlcs to anti-
competitive practices with an  international dimension.  For example, information central 
to the investigation may be located outside their jurisdiction and thus  be  beyond their 
reach.  Absent the necessary proof of anti-competitive conduct, competition authorities 
are unable to take remedial action. 
Avoidance of conflict of law and remedies 
The 1980s and 1990s have seen a significant increase in  international mergers, strategic 
alliances,  joint  ventures,  licensing  agreements  etc.  These  arrangements  may  face 
examination by different authorities at the same time with a potential for a conflict in the 
law or remedy applied to the same case.  In  an extreme example, divergences in the laws 
applicable to the same set of facts may result in  conflicting conclusions as to the legality 
of the behaviour under review.  However, even where there is a common view as to the 
anti-competitive nature of the conduct, the remedies imposed in each jurisdiction may be . 
incompatible. 
Greater  convergence  of laws  and  cooperation  between  competition  authorities  would 
reduce the likelihood of such conflicts and promote greater legal certainty for business. 
A voiding unnecessary duplication of work and costs 
The  review  of commercial  practices  involves  considerable  work  and  costs,  both  for 
competition authorities and for the businesses whose conduct is subject to review.  If the 
same commercial practice falls within several jurisdictions the costs increase accordingly. 
3  In parallel, those member States who did not have competition authorities prior to the establishment of 
the Community, have enacted legislation and set up enforcement structures at national level 
4 Grc;\tcr coop:.:r:!tion  and the elimination of unnecessary duplication of dfort, can reduce 
co~;ts to comp::tition :~uthoritics and business alike  . 
.RXJ2ill'L~P  I!.t:J~;_ 
Certain practiccs arc difficult to tackle under present rules by any agency.  Por examplc, 
export cartels~ have,  for  trade reasons (the wish of countries to  improve their tenns of 
trade) not been subject to competition la\v in exporting countries.  Por legal and practical 
reasons too, competition law  has not been  applied.  Absent an  effect on  the exporting 
country's markets, the competition authority has no jurisdiction over export cartels.  For 
the importing country, export cartels have an effect on the market and so jurisdiction can 
be established, but the evidence needed to prove the existence of the cartels is  located 
outside the importing country's jurisdiction. 
In all these cases the instmments at the disposal of the Community and its Member States 
are inadequate. 
More  generally,  in  today's  libcralised  world  the  Community  cannot  be  without  an 
external dimension to its competition policy.  The Community interest is to seek the same 
commitment to competition enforcement from our partners in their markets as  we apply 
to operators, irrespective of their origin, on ours. 
c)  The trndc nersncctivc 
Balance of access op..nortnnitli& 
Anticompetitive practices affect the balance of access opportunities negotiated between 
WTO Members.  They belong to the next barriers to trade in  a  libcraliscd world.  The 
application of competition law contributes to creating accessible markets and to assuring 
the overall openness and stability of the trading system.  Community efforts in this area 
need to be matched by our partners.  Competition policy is now clearly trade-related, and 
the  application  of competition  law  principles  on  export  markets  will  help  level  the 
playing field and promote equal conditions of competition for our firms  competing on 
international markets. 
While governments today arc subject to very strict international disciplines in  respect of 
the laws they make or the measures they apply, as soon as these have an effect on trade, 
no rules exist at  the international level to control anti-competitive commercial practices. 
Such  practices  can  replace  formal  governmental  barriers  that  have  been  reduced  or 
eliminated.  Arguably,  the  incentive  for  finns  to  engage  in  anticompctitivc  behaviour 
impeding market access, (such as cartels combined with boycotts, exclusionary abuse of a 
dominant position, exclusionary vertical restraints) increases with the reduction of tariffs 
and  other  barriers.  Also,  as  industrial  stmcturcs  in  emerging  economies  increase  in 
sophistication,  so  will  the  devices  used  by  firms  to  protect  the  market  from  foreign 
competition.  Finally,  governments  whose  freedom  of  action  to  support  domestic 
industries through administrative measures has been curtailed by intcrnatiomd rules, may 
be tempted  to  maintain  lax  st;mdards  of competition  regulation  or enforcement,  or to 
grant exceptions, to protect specific industrial sectors. 
4  Export cartels arc a sp~cific problem  in~;ofar as their negative effects arc only felt  in the 111:1rkct of the 
importing country, while the relevant infonll:!tioa is situ:.Jtcd in the exporting country.  The bttci" of 
cmm;c  h~.s neither an interest, nor the jurisdiction to take action. 
5 Although competttton  rules  do exist on  many of our export  markets,  anticompctitivc 
practices  are  often  impossible  to  tackle  without  active  enforcement  by  the  domestic 
competition  authority.  In  the  absence  of  international  rules  our  firms  have  to  rely 
exclusively  on  the  commitment  and  tenacity  of third  country  agencies  to  have  their 
concerns addresseds. 
Recent  developments  confirm  that  real  or  perceived  anticornpctitivc  practice~'  can 
generate trade friction and that the trading system has  b~cn unable to effectively resolve 




The inadequate application of competition principles on different markets can have other 
trade  effects.  C:!rtellization  or  similar  restrictive  behaviour  in  a  foreign  country  can 
enable firms to m:l!,:c  supracompetitive profits <tt  home and then sell products on export 
markets below cost price. This may trigger the usc of legitimate trade instnnn:::nts such :1'> 
antidumping duties  by the  importing country. But the use of trade instruments will  not 
address the activity on the exporting country's  marl~et and may also have  ncgativ~: side 
effects.  From an  economic  perspective  it  is  therefore  less  efficient  than  tac!;ling  the 
conduct on the exporting firm's horne market. 
Even  where  there  is  no  evidence  of dumping,  the  protection  afforded  to  companies 
through an inadequate application of competition rules on their home markets may place 
them in an advantageous position when competing on foreign markets. 
Some competition authorities pursue policies to address market access problems, caused 
by anti-competitive practices on foreign  markets,  by extending the territorial scope of 
their national competition rules. This raises concerns of  jurisdiction 
7 and sovereignty, and 
can lead to conflicts between countries. Moreover, there arc limits to the effectiveness of 
such a policy given the legal and practical obstacles to seeking information outside one's 
jurisdiction. 
5  Note, however, that in  the US the enforcement system is geared towards private action in civil courts : 
private parties nrc actively encouraged to bring cases by the possibility of winning treble damages.  The 
competition provisions in the  EC Treaty and national kgislations can also be invoked by private parties 
before national courts. Domestic courts in third countries arc often not, however, as easily access! hie. 
6 
7 
Note, however, that in May 1995 Koch:k tiled a petition with the US Government (USTR) under Section 
30 I of the US Trade Act, alleging that there arc anticompctitivc barriers restrictir.r, open access to  the 
Japanese m~ukct for consumer photographic film and paper. On 13 June 1996 Acting USTR D:1rshcfsky 
mndc a determination of "unrc:1sonablc practices" and initiated dispute settlement in  the VITO, on the 
grounds  of  "nullification  and  irnpainncnt"  of  expected  GATf  benefits  and  violation  of  GATS 
commitments.  Coll.';ultations  will  also  be  conducted  under the  1960 GATf Decision  011  rcstricti vc 
business practices. 
Sec The )l)().'i US international antitrust enforcement guidelines. US attempts to impose its  law beyond 
its  juri~diction  kd  C:mada,  France,  Germany,  the  UK,  the  Netherlands  and  Switzerland  to  adopt 
blocking legislation.  Section 301  of the  1974 Trade Act also allows trade action to be taken to counter 
the toleration by foreign governments of anticornpctitivc practices. 
6 Enhanced international cooperation woulcllirnit competition authorities' need to resort to 
extraterritorial  action.  Thcr~ arc  compelling  advantages  to  solving  problems  through 
cooperation,  especially  if  such  cooperation  improves  the  likelihood  that  the 
anticompctitive behaviour can be eliminated. 
There have been  many  initiatives  to  establish  rules  on  anticompctitivc conduct  in  the 
past.  The Havana Charter was  based on  the concept of comprehensive rules covering 
both  public  and  private practices  and  devoted  a  whole chapter to  restrictive  business 
practices R.  The Charter was not ratified however and was succeeded by the more modest 
GATT, which examined the trade-competition interface a number of times in  the  1950s 
and  1960s, but with no clear result 
9
•  In  the  1970s a full  Competition Code was finally 
negotiated  in  the  framework  of UNCTAD
10  at  the  request of developing countries.  Its 
provisions arc not binding. 
The OECD has carried  out  significant  work  in  the  international  competttton  area for 
many  years.  It  has  adopted  a  Recommendation  that  includes  a  non-binding  but 




The WTO contains limited tailor-made rules on competition in each of its three "pillar" 
Agreements 
12
•  The General  Agreement  on  Trade  in  Goods  (GATT)  has  an  annexed 
Agreement on Trade Related Investment Measures (TRIMs) which provides for a review, 
to  be  conducted  within  five  years  of  its  entry  into  force,  to  consider  whether  the 
Agreement  should  be  complemented  with  provisions  on  competition  policy
13
•  The 
8  See its Chapter V. The 194  7 Charter foresaw the establishment of an International Trade Organisation 
to  oversee  world  trade.  The  Organisation  was  mandated  to  net  against  anticompetitive  practices:  it 
would  have  had  an  investigative  cnp:~city  and  be  entitled  to  issue  recommend:~tions on  remedial 
me:~sures. The Charter, which also included rules on investment, was not adopted ami n number of its 
provisions were bundled together in the less ambitious GATT Treaty that was, in turn, superseded by 
the WTO on I January 1995. 
9  Sec GATT DISD 7S/29, 9S/28, 170. 
10 
The Set of Multilaterally Agreed Equitable Principles and Rules for the Control of Restrictive Business 
Practices was adopted hy the UN General Assembly in December 1980. (UN Doc. A/35/48 ( 1980)). 
11  Amended in 1995. This Rccommend:~tion includes a voluntary dispute settlement procedure, which has 
never been used. (C (95) 130/final). 
12  The WTO lw.s  three "pillar"  Agreements, covering trade in  goods (GATT), trade in  services (GATS) 
ami the  tmde-rclatcd aspects of intellectual  property rights  (TRIPs). The Agreement establishing the 
WTO  itself as  well  as  the  intcr;rntcd  Dispute  Settlement  Underst:~mling  ovcr:~rch the  three  separate 
Agreements. The WTO also includes a number of Plurilateral Agreements, which arc binding between 
the signatorie~; only. 
The  GATT  A~:rcement on  trade  in  DOods  contains  a  provision  to  ensure  commercial  conduct  of 
catcrpri~c:; that have been  rra:1~c'd  ~:p~::ial or exclw:ivc rights  (Article XVII GATT - which does not 
fu:1ction very w.::ll). It hns b::cn arr;ud tlt:\t :mticomp:.:titivc conduct could be t:td:lcd throuL;h a so-cnlled 
"non-violation" complaint. 
13 
Il1ulti!a:cml ru!:::  on invc::tmcnt rrc currently bc:ing  •~e:_'oti::tctl  in  the OECD ;md  the \VTO  m:~y st :r t 
7 Agreement on the trade-related aspects of intellectual  property rights  (TRIPs) cont::1ins 
provisions  on  the  control  of  anti-competitive  practices  or  conditions  in  contractual 
licenses, relating to the transfer of technology or of other proprietary information.  It also 
recognises the right of countries to regubte such practices through their domestic  law~;. 
and  it  provides  for  consultations  and  exchange  of information  between  governments 
where there is reason to believe that licensing practices or conditions constitute an  almst: 
and have an adverse effect on competition in the relevant market.  Likewise, the Gl:ncral 
Agreement  on  Trade  in  Services  (GATS)  contains  provisions  on  consultation  and 
exchange of informntion, similar to those in the TRIPs Agreement, and rcguirc~; countri;~s 
to  ensure  that  monopoly  services  providers  do  not  abuse  their  position  in  activilit:s 
outside the scop~ of their monopoly privilege. 
However, the scope of these provisions remains very limited for the effective control of 
anticompctitive practices at the  international  level.  More importantly, the  lac!:  or BIOil~ 
comprehensive multilateral principles and standards for the application ami enforcement 
of  comp~tition policies, may undermine past ;mel  present international trade libcralisation 
efforts. 
Parallel to the  above developments an  increasing number of countries have negotiated 
bilateral  agreements  on  cooperation  between  their  competition  authorities.  Such 
Agreements have been negotiated in the Union both at the Community and the natiord 
level.  At  Community level, for example, a cooperation agreement has been concluded 
with the US. Amongst others it provides for notification of enforcement aetivitic~; by one 
party that may effect the important interests of the other; information exchange in certain 
circumstances;  consultation  and  cooperation  and  avoidance  of  conflicts  over 
enforcement activities.  The so-called positive comity instrument stands out'4,  because it 
permits a party whose important interests arc affected hy anticompetitivc practices within 
the other party's territory to ask the latter to examine them and take appropriate measures. 
In  general, the substance of these treaties has also evolved and their contents arc  more 
developed today than before. 
Notwithstanding the  wide consensus on  the  promotion of deeper bilateral  cooperation 
among  competition  authorities,  bilateral  cooperation  agreements,  similar  to  OECD 
efforts, remain limited in scope and in effect.  In scope, because although increasing, only 
the EU and a limited number of countries which arc very actively involved in enforcing 
competition  policies,  have  entered  such  agreements;  and,  in  effect,  because  these 
agreements do not contain substantive mles or principles. 
Another question is  whether, next to the above, the proliferation of sector-specific trade 
agreements  that  include  competition  provisions  which  e~1ch  have  their  own  specific 
characteristics,  can  be  kept  coherent.  This  becomes  more  significant  ns  the 
interrelationship between trade in  goods, services and foreign investment increases, and 
as  respective  geographic  markets  overlap.  At  best,  firms  will  pres~;  governments  to 
ensure  that  their  policies  arc  streamlined  and ·consistent.  At  worst,  they  will  s\.:d:  to 
exploit the provisions of such agreements for narrow corporate advantage through forum-
shopping. 
work in  this field soon. Competition rules may contribute to cnsurinE that (foreign)  investm~nts arc only 
made under sound nnd competitive conditions. 
14  See Article V. 
8 A  more coordinated policy grouping together a  number of countries and  straddling all 
sectors of the economy then needs to he considered. 
There  arc  four  alternative  fora  to  house  an  international  framework:  the  OECD, 
UNCT  AD,  the negotiation of a separate, stand-alone agreement, or the WTO. 
The OECD has  been involved in  the area of international competition rules  for  a  long 
time and is  serviced by an  independent Secretariat.  It has the organisational capacity to 
cater for the negotiation of an agreement on international competition rules.  However the 
OECD has three disadvantages: it docs not have a track record of dealing with binding 
commitments and dispute settlement, it docs not provide the disciplines on competition-
related  trade measures  (which  arc dealt  with  in  the  WTO), and,  importantly,  it  has  a 
limited Membership. 
UNCTAD developed a  full  Competition  Code in  the  1970s  which has  been  regularly 
revised.  However, many of the same objections that apply to the OECD also apply to 
UNCTAD, i.a.  the absence of a tradition of dealing with binding commitments and the 
lack of an  overlap with competition-related trade  disciplines  (which  arc  dealt  with  in 
WTO). 
It may be difficult to gather the necessary political momentum in  different countries for 
an  independent,  stand-alone  agreement,  and  its  functioning  would  likely  have  higher 
overhead costs. 
The WTO is  the prime candidate for a  framework  of competition  rules:  it  has  a  near 
universal membership
15
•  The WTO can  provide a  balanced response  sensitive to  the 
varying interests and concerns of both developed and developing countries. 
The WTO is  the  recognised  institution  for  trade  related  international  economic  rules. 
Many of its  present rules arc closely related to  competition issues (especially those on 
subsidies, state enterprises and  intellectual  property).  Some of its  Agreements already 
have a number of specific provisions to address anticompetitive practices (sec under I.e 
above). 
The  institutional  infrastructure  of the  WTO  includes  a  system  of  transparency  and 
surveillance  through  notification  requirements  and  monitoring  provisions.  These  arc 
common  to  many  WTO/GATT  Agreements.  The  WTO  also  provides  a  fmum  for 
continuous  negotiation  and  consultation,  where  its  Members  could  bring  their  trade-
related  competition  concerns.  Furthermore,  the  Organisation  has  a  reinforced  and 
legalised dispute settlement system between governments. This can back-up agreed rules 
and provide means for conflict resolution. 
The  WTO  also  caters  for  the  possibility  of negotiating  an  Agreement  with  specific 
15 o  ~- r  1·  ·  1·1  c1·  ·  ver  twenty  1vc  ormcr  state  tra(  111~~  economy  countncs,  amongst  w uc t  una  and  Rw;sta,  nrc 
currently m:gotiatinr, their accession to the WTO. disciplines  between  a  limited  number  of  signatories  (thereby  creating  a  so-called 
Plurilateral Agreement under Annex IV of the WTO Agreement). 
III. h..N  iNTRflNATlONAl! FRA!Vlf.WQI_1l(  OE_lHJLEs_j)_N_C_OMPii'JJJ.:_lQT1L:: 
JSSUF_,_S_FOn  CONSIDl~RbJJOJ'i 
A  premise of this  Communication is  that the  creation  of an  International  Competition 
Authority, with its own powers of investigation and enforcement,  i~; not a feasible option 
for the medium term. Countries would at this stage be unwilling to accept the con.ctr(!ints 
on  national sovereignty and policies that such a structure would impose.  The  propo~;;1l:; 
set  out  below  and  in  the  annex  therefore  rcOect  a  more  modest  approach,  built  on 
commitments binding government~; and providing intergovernmental procedures. This  i~: 
also the model on which the international trading system has been built since the Second 
World War. 
Work on a framework of international competition rules is  most likely to  make headway 
if a progressive approach is  adopted.  The objective would be to strengthen  comp::_~tition 
policy coordination in  steps (building-blocks approach).  This could be achieved through 
the creation of a working group in  WTO, whereby initial work might be limited to  those 
areas where consensus can be mustered at an early stage, and more ambitious objectives 
would be tackled later.  The main steps can be identified as follows: 
a)  Acl!mtion of domestic comp_etition structures 
A  first  step could be taken  by  WTO Members committing themselves  individually to 
assuring the existence of domestic competition structures.  The core clements of such a 
stmcture would be : 
having  basic  competition  rules  in  domestic  laws  to  address  anti-competitive 
practices, covering restrictive agreements of companies, abuse of dominant position, 
and mergers; 
having  or  creating  domestic  enforcement  stmctures  to  guarantee  an  effective 
implementation  of  those  rules,  including  proper  investigatory  instruments  and 
appropriate sanctions; 
ensuring access for private parties to the domestic enforcement authorities, including 
national courts, on equitable, transparent and non-discriminatory terms. 
In parallel WTO Members could seek to identify a core of common principles, and work 
towards their adoption at international level.  This would : 
promote equal conditions of competition world-wide; 
facilitate closer cooperation between competition authorities and pave the  way  for 
10 th~ coarclination of international enforcement activity; 
promote a gr;1dual convergence of competition law!;. 
Common principles or rules can be developed progressively and step by step. It  may be 
oppo~-tunc, in  a first stage, to concentrate on horizontal restraints (price or output fixing 
or market sharing cartels, hid-rigging,  group  boycotts, export cartels).  Work on  other 
practices  (abw;c  of a  dominant  position,  certain  vertical  restraints  such  as  exclusive 
distribution or supply agreements) could start in parallel, but may take more time. 
Transparency is an essential clement of a framework of competition.  Provisions could be 
developed on  notification,  information exchange and cooperation between competition 
authorities.  These  could  include  provisions  regarding  cooperation  procedures,  for 
example  when  agencies  arc  launching  parallel  investigations  into  the  same  practice. 
Neg;:tivc and  positive comity instruments could also be developed furthcrl6. 
{1)  llisntJtc settlement 
Apart  from  its  natural  role  as  a  permanent  forum  for  negotiation  adapting  or 
strengthening  agreed  rules  and  obligations,  the  WTO  also  provides  a  compliance 
mechanism  to  help  settle  disputes  between  governments  when  a  country claims  that 
agreed WTO rules have been breached. Private parties do not have access to the WTO's 
dispute  settlement system.  The WTO  mechanisms could be applied  if a  country for 
example fails to set up a domestic competition structure or if it fails to react in a specific 
case to a request for enforcement action lodged by another WTO Member.  The relevant 
rules could be adapted, if necessary, to the specificities of cmnpetition law and policy, 
and could be applied in a progressive way. 
The above concepts are further developed in the annex. 
IV. RELATED ISSUES 
a)  Who ~honlrl mwticipnte? 
An international agreement on competition mles would bring benefits to all nations of the 
trading  community.  All  countries  could  participate  in  an  agreement  to  incorporate 
competition Jaw provisions in their domestic laws. 
At the same tim~ the application of the cooperation and cnforccmmt provisions would 
require, of p:1rticipating countries, that they have a sophisticated administration capable 
IG  Th:::::c could b:: inspired by OECD provisions a;:  well  as  thw:e  in  bilateral agreements.  The principle of 
nc~::1tivc comity  impli·:s  ll:~t  a  Party  l'.'ill  tnl:c  into  :\ccount  the  import;mt  inkrcsts of another  Pm"ty 
before ::ction is  t:~!:cn.  Through the pm:itivc comity  in~:trumcnt (~·:ce also ab,1ve  p:1p,c  7), a 1':.\rty  n1:1y 
recp~::;:t :mother to r:ct on th(;  b:1~:i:: of it.':  own powers, to  invcstig:11c activities which :1dver;:ely affect the: 
important interests of thG  fir~! Party. 
11 of handling sensitive  information  and of assessing commercial practices  in  a  dynamic 
context. Many developing countries do not yet have this administrative machinery. 
It is therefore realistic to expect that, if adopted, cooperation provisions of a competitio11 
agreement would, in  a  first  stage,  apply only  between  a  limited  number of signatoric~; 
with mature antitrust agencies. Provisions could group together develop~d :mcladnnccd 
developing countries to  start with,  and gradually come to  include more  countric~;. Any 
country able to shoulder the obligations of the agreement could be elir,ible to participatf'. 
A  different intensity of cooperation, for example in  the field  of information exchange, 
could apply between different countries. 
Private anticompctitive practices have long been a concern for developing countrie~:.  As 
the  turnover  of many  multinationals  has  come  to  surpass  the  GDP  of  middle  _<;jzc 
developing countries, developing countries have seen a growing need for a minimum of 
discipline on private conduct in their markets.  It was in response to this that lJNCTAD 
developed its competition Code in  1980.  It would certainly be consistent with this stance 
for developing countries to support a further strengthening of international mlcs, certainly 




Even if developing countries  might not,  in  a  first  stage, participate in  the provisions on 
cooperation  between  competition  authorities  (sec  under  III  a.  above),  they  would  b8 
beneficiaries  of enhanced  control  over  anticompetitive  practices  with  an  intcmational 
dimension.  They  would  also,  like  other  WTO  Members,  have  access  to  the  dispute 
settlement  provisions  if. agreed  basic  rules  and  enforcement  stmcturcs  had  not  h~cn 
properly  implemented  by  other  countries.  Moreover,  they  would  benefit  from  the 
acceptance  by  developed  or  newly  industrialised  countries  of MFN  obligations  in  the 
competition field, even if their own obligations were lighter (eg.  in  respect of transitional 
periods). Finally, all  WTO Members, including developing countries, would benefit from 
possible  dispute  settlement  judgements  which  might  create  new  market  access 
opportunities. 
Insofar as  competition mles can ensure  that  investments arc  made under sound  and  fair 
conditions, effective competition structures can support liberal investment regimes. 
The establishment of appropriate competition structures is  a complex task and requires 
substantial  resources  and  training.  A  framework  on  competition  should  include 
provisions on technical assistance for those countries requesting it. 
c)  Tl~  r~JnJiQnJo trndr defence instr11pwnts 
17 
Note,  however.  that  a  compe1tt10n  framework  cannot  be  a  panacea  for  the  uif!iculties  faced  by 
devclopinr, countries as a  result of their limited domrstic  instruments and cap;\cities of investigation. 
This reinforces the need for developing countries to be able to benefit from technical assistance. 
12 Tk: rel:~1irm  ~~~:iw:~::l  111·~ ebbm;ltion of ;•  Ctllllp:.:tilion  \'r;mh:\'!or!: ;md tk  1-ll!!'.:lio'lillg or 
~:;:i::litir~ 1r:,:k iw;t:·u;n~;Hs i:;  ;: l:ey  i~:~;u:.:  iii  til(;  tratk-comp~:titio:l d::batt:.  1:  i~:  tn1t:  th:ll  :!1<: 
iliCOip:l;-~:iu;:  ._.r  ccl:llp:::tition  p:-z,·:i~:iow  into tr:!de  law ;mel/or  mon: cornprdJcn:;i··,· :!!ld 
clTcctivc  crifu;ccmcnt  of  comp:;ti!ion  policie~;  through  incrc:l<:::-;d  intcnntion:ll 
coopc:r;•.tion,  \'.'OU!d  h.:s<:t:ll  !he  ncc:d  to  have  rccoun;e  to  instrttll!Ctll~:  of  COlllil11.'l'Ci:1l 
d:.:fcncc.  Ilo\';cvcr,  competition  in~:tmmcnts cannot  k:  seen  a~;  ~;u\lstitutes  for  tr::>dc 
instrument~;.  Th-e  latter only lose their raison  d'Nre  in  the context of fully  integr:ltcd 
markets. A  frameworL of competition rules would, therefore, complement present trade 
law and create a new instrument to tackle anticompetitive behaviour in markets which arc 
not  integrated.  Thus  the  development  of  new  instruments  would  complement.  not 
supplant, present instnnncnts. 
The above is illustmtcd by practice within the EC itself.  Antidumping acti~n is excluded 
on  intra-Community trade,  as  this. is  a  fully  integrated market 
1x.  This integration  has 
meant,  for Member States: the elimination of all  tariffs, the elimination of measures of 
equivalent effect to  tariffs  (which  is  a  wider concept than  GA  1Ts national  treatment 
obligation)  and  the  adoption  of  the  four  freedoms  (goods,  services  -including 
establishment, capital - including investment, and labour). The single market programme 
and relative currency stability have been added to this. Competition law has been applied 
effectively, amongst others with an explicit objective to integrate the markets of Member 
States, by an authority with autonomous powers of investigation and enforcement. All of 
these clements arc absent in present day world trade.  Finally the framework explored 
under II. above falls well short of EC competition structures, and would have to prove its 
worth. 
d)  The rclptionJQJhrS-.nmm!.mity Jcpnl order nnd Member St~ 
A  basic assumption of this  Communication is  that a  framework  of competition  rules, 
negotiated in WTO,  would be compatible with  EC competition  law,  in  particular the 
provisions  of  the  EC  Treaty.  The  WTO  instrument  would,  as  is  traditional  in 
GATT/WTO, apply to governments and not be self-executing or have  direct effect. It 
would also be much more general than  the relevant provisions under EC law, and the 
emphasis would in the first stages be on procedural obligations.  For these reasons alone 
it is  highly unlikely that there should be any friction between a WTO panel report on the 
rules  agreed  in  the  WTO,  and  ECJ  case  law  on  Articles  85  and  86  and  related 
lcgislation19• 
Moreover  firms  arc  already,  including  within  the  Community,  subject  to  different 
competition  regimes,  and  an  objective  of  an  international  framework  is  exactly  to 
promote  equivalent  and  rational  application  of  competition  principles  on  different 
markets. 
18  The EEA Agreement between the EC and EFT  A countries follows the same approm:h: anti-dumping is 
excluded in  tho!;c area's where the  "acquis communautair<.:"  has  be<.:n  taken over.  In trade between the 
Community and the countries of central and eastern Europ<.:,  however, anti-dumpinr, action can stilt be 
taken,  a<>  well  a•;  between  th•:  US,  Cnn:~da and  Mexico  in  th:.:  NAf•TA  <.:ontext.  The  sanv:  applies 
between  th•:  EU  and  Turkey:  an!i-dumpine  <!ction  remains  a  possibility  despite  th~  cmtom:'  union 
ar,rccmcnt. 
19  A  ca~:e  where  a  VITO  instrum-::nl  nnd  a  corresponding  EC  regulation  nr<.:  even  clof:cr  th:m  in  tll'.o 
competition fic!cl  is  :mti-Jumpin.~. In tlli!:  c:•::c  the bttcr is  even an impbncnt:ttion of th·~ fornwr,  ye1 
friction b:?twccn  p::nd  report~:  h~·:cd on the WTO instrument, and EC.T  judt~em::nt,:  b:.:~;:"d  on th·.:  E" 
rcgul:!tion, has so Lr been ~:voided. 
13 A second issue concerns the question of participation in  an  international  framcworl~. As 
competition  is  not  an  exclusive  Community  competence,  international  cases  might 
involve either the Community (if trade between Member States were affected) or a single 
Member State (if it  alone  were  affected).  A  framework  of mles  would  have  to  take 
account of both cases, while preserving the unity of Community action in the trade field. 
V.  CONCLUSIONS 
The Commission requests the Council to take note of this Communication. 
Noting that by pursuing stronger multilateral efforts the benefits of greater convergence 
and improved competition standards and enforcement \vould be realized world-wide; 
Considering  that an  international  framework  of competition rules  can promote a  levtl 
playing  field  and  could  therefore  reduce  the  costs,  distortions  and  conflicts  in 
international trade arising from differing domestic competition regimes; 
Recognising  that,  alongside  continued  bilateral  cooperation  with  princip:-~1  partners 
stronger multilateral cooperation in  the field of competition is  desirable and feasible  at 
this time, and would contribute sienificantly to  a  more efficient, stable, and integrated 
global economy, from which both the Community and its Member States, as we11  as  a11 
WTO Members, would benefit; 
Recognising that the possible development of an international framework of  comp~t1t1on 
rules is in the interest of a11  trading nations, irrespective of their level of development; 
Considering that the Community has a sound experience in applying uniform competition 
principles across different countries. 
The Commission suggests the Council to conclude along the following lines: 
•  The  Community  should  prepare  a  position  for  the  WTO  Ministerial  meeting  in 
Singapore  in  December  1996;  this  should  propose  to  WTO  Members  that  the 
Organisation  establish  a  Working  Party  to  conduct exploratory  work,  from  1997 
onwards, on the development of an international framework of competition rules; 
.,  Such a  framework  could  include,  in  particular:  a  commitment by  a11  countries to 
adopt  domestic  competition  mles  and  enforcement  structures  and,  for  a  limited 
number of countries, an  instmment to allow information to  be  exchanged between 
competition authorities, an  instrument to request action on foreign  markets, and an 
intergovernmental dispute settlement mechanism; 
eo  that  the  European  business  community  should  be  consulted  and  appropri<!lcly 
associated as progress in this area is made; 
.,  that the Community should take  the  lead on  this  issue and initiate efforts to  build 
international consensus and encourage other WTO Members to support multilateral 
work in this field; 
14 •  to request the OECD and UNCTAD to pursue their work on  trade and competition 
taking account of developments in WTO. 
15 ANNEX 
This  annex  outlines  the  main  concepts  set  out under  Part Ill of the  Communication. 
Many of the concepts have been extracted from OECD documents and other sources, and 
are included on an exploratory basis: 
a)  A<lontion of Domestic Competition Structures 
The process towards an international framework of competition rules could be carried out 
in  a  progressive  way.  A  first  step could  be  to  ensure  that each country provides for 
competition  rules  in  its  mtional  legislation,  covering restrictive  agreements,  abuse  of 
dominant position and mergers.  This would include the provision of a set of equitable 
procedures  ensuring  an  effective  application  of  the  rules,  includine  investigatory 
instruments  and  appropriate  penalties,  as  well  as  access  to  the  judicial  system, 
transparency and non-discrimination. 
Although an increasing number of countries have a sophisticated competition law for the 
effective control of restrictive business practices, some (developing) countries have yet to 
introduce  such  rules.  An  added  advantage  of  agreement  by  all  countries  to  t:nnct 
competition Jaws  is  that domestic courts would become an  integral part of enforcement 
procedures, as they arc in most industrialised countries already
20
• Firms could not then be 
obliged  to  respect  agreements  which  were  forbidden:  these  would  be  uncnforcc:1ble 
before national courts. 
Another  important  issue  is  sectoral  comprehensiveness.  A  recent  OECD  study  has 
revealed  that  ev<;n  in  OECD  countries  substantial  gaps  exist  in  the  coverage  of 
competition laws;  most countries exclude sectors of the economy from their competition 
law application
21
•  A  first  step in  addressing  this  could be  taken  by  a  listing of these 
sectors and a commitment to stand-still and gradual reduction by all countries22• 
Competition rules should likewise apply to  all  economic operators.  Public enterprises 
and companies with special or exclusive rights should be covered, except for that part of 
their  activities  where  their  public  task  overrides  the  interests  of  competition  law 
application. 
There  is  general  recognition  of  the  negative  effects  on  compctltton  of  horizontal 
restrictive practices:  cartels, market sharing,  boycott of foreign  firms,  price fixing,  bid 
rigging,  collective exclusive dealing.  It should  be  possible  to  formulate  international . 
provisions at an early stage to combat these practices.  Relevant provisions should also 
20 
A  similar  approach  was  adopted  in  the  Uruguay  Round  negotiations  on  the  respect  of intellectual 
property right~ (TRIPs). 
21 
Overview on Coverage of Competition Laws and Policies by Prof. B. Hawk. 
22 Sec OECD work iu  this respect. cover export cartels.  These arc exempted from the applicability of competition taw in 
exporting  countries.  Although  such  cartels  arc  covered  by  the  legislation  of most 
importing countrics
23
, they arc hard to tackle due to a lack of information in the importing 
country.  An international agreement to outlaw export cartels would put an  end to these 
"beggar thy neighbour" policies. 
Vertical restrictions, such as exclusive distribution or supply agreements, should also be 
considered, but a longer period may be required to reach consensus, and countries may 
wish  to  maintain  a  greater  degree  of latitude  in  their  assessment  of the  effects  on 
competition of vertical restraints
24
• 
A  common  approach  to  vertical  restrictions  could  be  found  by  concentrating  on 
restrictions which create barriers to market access.  The working group  could examine to 
what extent competition authorities could take into account the international dimension 
and  weigh  the effects  on  domestic competition  of market  access  restrictions,  when  a 
complaint is lodged through the provisions of the international framework (see later). 
Such  a  review  by  a  competition  authority  would  reflect  the  fact  that  no  adequate 
assessment  of  competition  cases  can  be  made  without  careful  examination  of  the 
international context: competition policies cannot be identical in different countries, and 
that  each  market  needs  to  be  assessed  in  its  own  context,  in  consideration  of  the 
economic conditions and structures influencing the openness, and thus  the competitive 
situation, of that market.  In  their review of practices, competition authorities would, as 
many already do, give weight to  factors such as:  the effect of trade barriers (tariffs and 
non-tariff  barriers),  regulatory  barriers  (i.e.  divergent  standards,  restrictions  on 
distribution or supporting  services), foreign  investment barriers, the import and foreign 
investment ratio, and the corporate groupings structure.  Competition authorities would 
continue  to  base  their  decisions  on  the  efficiency  goals  that  arc  fundamental  to 
competition policy.  But the principle, that the  international  dimension needs  be  taken 
into  account  in  international  cases,  would  be  incorporated  into  common  rules  with 
respect to all  anti-competitive practices
25
:  As  a market would be assessed to  be more 
closed,  greater  weight  would  be  given  to  the  importance  of foreign  competition  to 
balance entry barriers. 
This approach might also be useful in working towards agreement on abuse of dominant 
position.  It  is  generally  agreed  that  exclusionary  practices;  hindering  of access  to 
essential facilities;  practices with possible foreclosure effects such as  fidelity rebates or 
tying  arrangements;  nod  production  limitation  can  all  amount  to  abuse  of dominant 
23  E.g. Wood Pulp -judgement of the European Court of Justice of 27 Scptemhcr 1988, 1988 ECR 5193. 
23  Partly  due  to  differences  in  underlying  ohjectives  and  principles  the  Community and  some  trading 
partners  have  different  approaches:  the  Community  is  relatively  strict  on  vertical  restrictions  that 
interfere with market integration - export bans and  some territorial  restrictions;  the  US  take  a  more 
tolerant view.  An exception is resale price maintenance which is prohibited in most juridictions. 
25 
This approach  is  similar to  the  one taken  in  the  Havana  Charter (Article  46),  where  an  ahsense of 
government  action  to prevent  a  limitation  of access  to  markets  could  constitute  a  violation  of its 
provisions. The jurisprudence of the European Court of Justice follows similar lines, i.e. that a practice 
should  be  assessed  in  its  economic and  legal  context,  and  to  the  weight  traditionally  given  to  the 
objective of ensuring market access, although only between Member States.  E.g. Henninger (Deli mitis) 
-judgement of the ECJ of 28 February I 99 I. 
2 
It position.  ·As European competition policy enforcement has shown, these practices arc 
capable of affecting trade  and  creating access  barriers.  Other practices  would  require 
further consideration: excessive pricing, predatory pricing, some vertical arrangements. 
There has  been  a  great  increase  in  the  number of international  mergers.  It  would  be 
premature to suggest international substantive rules in this area.  At the same time firms 
arc today having to notify the same merger to  several different competition authorities. 
Procedural  harmonisation  would avoid unnecessary duplication  of efforts of firms  and 
agencies  and,  in  encouraging cooperation,  would  limit  the  potential  for  contradictory 
decisions
26




c)  Establishment of Instruments of Cooneration between Comnctition Authorities 
Meaningful information exchange is  a key clement of cooperation between competition 
authorities.  At the same time business information is subject to strict legal protection in 
all jurisdictions and  it  is  difficult to  imagine confidential  documents being exchanged 
between competition authorities as a routine matter
2
R. 
Information exchange would have to be developed cautiously.  In a general sense the will 
of agencies to cooperate will certainly be the greatest when they arc investigating a same 
case and intend to apply similar enforcement criteria.  Exchange becomes more difficult 
when different solutions arc being envisaged.  At the extreme there may be a situation 
where one agency seeks clear enforcement measures while a counterpart has no intention 
of taking action.  Although the last example is  the most difficult, it is then that the need 
for exact information may be the most acute. 
An important first step towards the development of rules on information exchange could 
be  to  catalogue  the  types  of information  that  arc  considered confidential  in  different 
countries, and what forms oflegal protection apply. 
An international  framework could, in  the beginning, provide for  the exchange of non-
confidential  business  information between  a  group of core participating countries.  A 
further step might be taken,  if this  mechanism is  felt  to function  well,  by considering 
26 
The 1990 Merger Regulation has extrajurisdictional effects: it includes competence for the Commission 
to examine mergers of firms headquartered outside the EC, if they have a turnover of 5  billion Ecu or 
more and where two of the undertakings concerned have a turnover within the EC of at least 250 million 
Ecu. As more Agencies scrutinise mergers it  is  possible that one Agency may forbid  it,  while another 
imposes conditions such as divestiture of certain parts or alternatively may sec no objection at all. 
27 
The OECD 1993 Whish/Wood "Merger Process Convergence Report" has made a number of proposals 
to harmonise international procedures in the field of merger notifications. 
28 
It should he recalled that extensive international information exchange possibilities do exist in  catain 
sectors, for example between authorities controlling securities trade.  And different level~; of infon11ation 
exchanGe have already been ar,rccd in the competition field: the EEA Agreement for example provides 
for a  sh~ring of information between the Commission and the Ef.'TA Surveillance Authority.  Altltougl1 
the EC!US Cooperation Ap;recmcnt docs not provide for  the exchange of confidential infonn:ttiDll,  U:C: 
Congress  in  199·1  did  pass  new  legislation  to  enable  the  antitrust  agencies  to  pur~:uc  reciproc:il 
arrangements for the purpose of cxch:mging confidential inforrn:ttion, even in cases where  ~:an(;! ion·;  til:~! 
may be taken arc different to those under US law. 
3 whether certain authorities arc ready to exchange information of a more detailed nature 
bilaterally on the basis of consent.  Clearly, such an exchange of confidential information 
would have to be made subject to a set of criteria and guarantees.  It  is  conceivable that 
agencies would wish to make exchange subject to the fulfilment  of certain conditions 
(e.g.  guarantees on confidentiality or limits to  the use of the  supplied information):  in 
particular  the  receiving  authority  would  have  to  commit  to  refrain  from  taking 
extraterritorial  action  on  the  basis  of that  information.  In  any  case,  full  exchange 
obligations arc likely to be a longer term objective. 
Clearly the European business community should be consulted and closely associated as 
options and conditions regarding the exchange of  confidential information arc explored. 
In  antidumping  investigations  officials  actually  have  extra jurisdictional  information 
gathering possibilities - they are usually given direct access to the files of the firms they 
investigate  in  third  countries.  A  similar clement could be  considered  in  competition 
cooperation  by  enabling  officials  to  assist  their  colleagues  in  third  countries  when 
investigations  are  being  pursued.  The  cooperation  procedures  that  apply  in  internal 
Community cases between DGIV and Member State authorities is  one example of such 
procedures. 
Another  key  element  of  cooperation  between  authorities  is  the  pos1ttve  comity 
instmmcnt, which has already been included in recent bilateral competition agreemcnts29• 
Options need to be explored to further develop this concept and to incorporate provisions 
that will  generate enforcement by third country agencies,  while  respecting each others' 
autonomy.  In  particular  it  could  be  considered  whether and  under  which  conditions 
competition  authorities  could,  within  reasonable  limits,  be  obliged  to  investigate  on 
behalf of one another, and to have to indicate to a requesting counterpart within an agreed 
time-limit whether enforcement action is envisagcd
30
• A decision not to act would have to 
be reasoned and supported by relevant factual material. 
d)  Dispute Settlement 
The gains of international cooperation have been set out earlier. It is clear, however, that 
the advantages would be the greatest if countries can be committed to abide by agreed 
mles. That would generate a commitment to enforcement.  A framework should therefore 
have a binding character.  · 
A  central question concerning the  development of a  dispute settlement system,  which 
would apply between governments, relates to the standard of review that an  international 
panel could apply.  At a first  stage, review by a panel might concentrate on  procedural 
aspects: whether a country has enacted a domestic competition stmcture as  agreed;  if a 
country  is  subject  to  information  exchange  obligations,  whether  these  have  been 
complied with; and, if a country has commitments in  this area, whether the transparency 
29  See also above in footnote 16. 
30 
This has implications for the allocation of resources of antitrust agencies. It may be necessary, in a first 
stage,  to  put a  maximum on the  amount of complaints  one  agency  could  lodge  to  another within  a 
framework per year, or to  have a threshold (e.g.  turnover in  the product concerned) below which the 
mechanism would not apply. 
4 motivation and timetable requirements of the positive comity instrument have been met 
in a specific case.  The dispute settlement system could be extended to include review of 
whether the statement of the reasons for the national decision was adequate, whether the 
facts  have  been  accurately  stated,  whether  there  has  been  any  "manifest  error  of 
appraisal" of the facts or whether there has been a "misuse of powers". 
An important issue would be the deadlines applied to resolution of international disputes. 
This is  because firms  confronted by anticompetitive practices  in  many cases have the 
option of asking for application of a protective trade measure. These can be activated at 
short notice. Clearly a framework to tackle anti competitive practices through competition 
instruments  will  have  to  function  with  short  deadlines  if  it  is  to  offer  a  credible 
alternative. 
Another key issue relates to remedies when a country is  condemned by an  independent 
panel.  Countries could be authorised,  in  the absence of corrective action  by a  foreign 
agency and under specified conditions, to take extra jurisdictional action through usc of 
their own domestic competition laws.  In  cases- where this is  not viable, (for example if 
there are  no  subsidiaries of the  targeted  firm  or firms  in  one's jurisdiction), measures 
usually foreseen in  the trade context, such as the withdrawal of tariff conccssions31 ,  arc 




Insofar as an agreement on competition might include binding clements, it is possible that 
a  derogation  clause of some kind  may be considered necessary.  This  would cater for 
cases where the essential interest of a party is felt to outweigh the enforcement interest of 
a  trading partner requesting action,  for example if the  latter has  invoked  the  positive 
comity  instmmcnt.  Such  an  exceptional  situation  could  arise  if an  authority  allows 
rcstmcturing agreements with restrictive effects.  Such issues have been resolved in trade 
law  cases  by  allowing  GA  TT/WTO  Members,  in  exceptional  cases,  to  derogate 
temporarily from  their obligations  and  take  safeguard  action  to  protect their domestic 
industries.  A similar approach in competition cases, provided measures taken arc time-
limited, justified, non-discriminatory and transparent, might need to be considered. 
31  The WTO system is geared towards conflict resolution and the withdrawal of trade concessions is  only 
used as a measure of last recourse. In WTO the resolution of conflicts has a sliding scale starting with 
(1)  agreement  of  the  parties  at  any  point  during  proceedings  through  consultations;  (2)  after 
determination by a panel of a violation of WTO rules, a request to bring the  incriminating measure or 
practice into conformity with  the  WTO; (3)  if this  is  not  possible, the  offering of compensation (by 
means of new or enlarged market access opportunities,  for example through tariff reductions or olher 
liberalising commitments), and finally,  if neither (1), (2), or (3) arc possible; (4)  the  authorisation to 
suspend an equivalent amount of concessions. 
32 
Prom a competition angle the withdrawal of trade concessions may seem to contradict the  objective of 
increasing competition, as its effect would be to lessen access opportunities to a market. In GATf!WTO 
practice, however, the ability to  withdraw trade concessions has actually had a liberalising cffccl, and 
has pressed countries to  bring their practices  into  line  with  GATT law.  Countermeasures have  only 
been authorised once. 
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